| dc.contributor |
Naval Postgraduate School |
|
| dc.contributor |
Operations Research (OR) |
|
| dc.creator |
Lin, Kyle Y. |
|
| dc.date |
September 11, 2020 |
|
| dc.date |
2022-04-01T17:32:15Z |
|
| dc.date |
2022-04-01T17:32:15Z |
|
| dc.date |
2020-09-11 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2022-05-19T07:34:21Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2022-05-19T07:34:21Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/69294 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/100051 |
|
| dc.description |
A defender dispatches patrollers to circumambulate a perimeter to guard against po tential attacks. The defender decides on the time points to dispatch patrollers and each
patroller’s direction and speed, as long as the long-run rate patrollers are dispatched
is capped at some constant. An attack at any point on the perimeter requires the
same amount of time, during which it will be detected by each passing patroller inde pendently with the same probability. The defender wants to maximize the probability
of detecting an attack before it completes, while the attacker wants to minimize it.
We study two scenarios, depending on whether the patrollers are undercover or wear
a uniform. Conventional wisdom would suggest that the attacker gains advantage if
he can see the patrollers going by so as to time his attack, but we show that the de fender can achieve the same optimal detection probability by carefully spreading out
the patrollers probabilistically against a learning attacker. |
|
| dc.format |
17 p. |
|
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.publisher |
ArXiv |
|
| dc.rights |
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. |
|
| dc.subject |
Search and surveillance |
|
| dc.subject |
Games/group decisions |
|
| dc.subject |
Probability |
|
| dc.title |
Optimal Patrol of a Perimeter |
|
| dc.type |
Preprint |
|