Every day, individuals are bombarded with readily available information, not all of which is accurate. Unfortunately, people make all kinds of decisions based on this faulty information, such as whether they should vaccinate their children, who to vote for, or what medical treatment to select. Furthermore, much research has established that it is extremely difficult to alter people’s false beliefs and that correcting false beliefs can backfire. One promising approach (Horne et al., 2015) is actually to not address the false belief per se, and instead focus on individuals’ decision-making processes associated with those beliefs. For example, when deciding whether to vaccinate one’s children, one must weigh the possible risks of a vaccine (including, possibly, the false belief that vaccines cause autism) and the risk of the diseases that they prevent. Horne and colleagues found that focusing attention on disease risk led to changes in attitudes towards vaccines without explicitly addressing people’s false beliefs. In Studies 1 and 2, I replicated and extended this approach in the context of vaccination. Study 1 directly replicated Horne et al (2015). As predicted, a focus on disease risk was more effective than an intervention that directly countered false beliefs about vaccines and autism. Study 2 extended this line of research with three specific aims: (1) again replicate the Horne et al (2015) and Study 1 findings, (2) address a potential confound in the earlier work, and (3) test a combined correction approach. Specifically, the earlier disease risk condition in the original studies included pictures and was significantly longer than the autism correction condition. Thus, Study 2 included a more thorough autism correction condition. Overall, there was no differential impact of the various interventions on attitudes and beliefs about vaccination, suggesting that the impact of addressing disease risk may not be robust. The third study in this dissertation used a similar approach to Horne et al (2015) and Studies 1 and 2 but applied to a different context; the safety of human consumption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Specifically, Studies 3a and 3b addressed a common misperception about the safety of GMOs in food. Study 3a found a marginal effect of a GMO explanation condition (designed to parallel the disease risk condition seen in Studies 1 and 2 and proposed by Horne et al (2015)) on individual beliefs about GMOs. Additionally, the GMO explanation condition was the most effective at altering GMO behavior/intentions scale items and individual beliefs about the environmental impact of GMOs. Finally, Study 3b was a preregistered replication of Study 3a, with a larger sample size (n = 692). The results of Study 3b suggested that a GMO explanation condition designed to parallel the disease risk condition, was successful at altering individual attitudes, beliefs, and behavior/intentions toward GMOs. These findings further support that effective misinformation correction approaches may applicable to different contexts when focusing on the risks associated with failing to engage in a certain behavior and the influence it has on the individual and society.PHDPsychologyUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149992/1/acaple_1.pdf