dc.creator |
World Bank |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T10:24:23Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T10:24:23Z |
|
dc.date |
2010-06-25 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T20:43:47Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T20:43:47Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000333038_20100928232055 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2906 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/243262 |
|
dc.description |
This note attempts to analyze and
tentatively answer these questions by focusing on the
drivers of growth and productivity, labor markets and
enterprise restructuring, as well as the state system of
enterprise support, which is key to understanding the
interplay between the state and the economy in Belarus. The
period of analysis covers 2004-08 with appropriate
references to the previous periods and comparisons with
Russia and/or other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
countries. The final section explores the Belarus's
industrial performance in the period of the global crisis
(late 2008-09) and reviews the government's policies
that have been largely responsible for a relatively mild
effect of the crisis on economic dynamics in the country.
The analysis is based on the official statistics provided to
the team by the National Statistics Committee (Belstat),
National Bank, and various ministries, as well as statistics
from other national and international statistical sources.
In addition, the analysis benefited from the data provided
by various enterprise surveys undertaken by the Research
Institute by the Ministry of Economy (RIME) and from two
sector case studies (in machinery and dairy sub-sectors).
Belarus has weathered the crisis so far better than most of
its neighbors, in part due to the government policies to
boost domestic demand in a predominantly state-owned and
controlled economy. This was achieved at a considerable
macroeconomic cost. The country's ability to sustain
possible future shocks declined, and macroeconomic risks
increased. The crisis has further exposed risks associated
with the Government of Belarus (GOB) practice of heavy
reliance on administratively set targets for large and
medium-size enterprises, especially targets for output and
average wage growth. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.publisher |
World Bank |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
ACCESS TO CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
ACCESS TO FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
ADMINISTRATIVE BARRIERS |
|
dc.subject |
AGRICULTURE |
|
dc.subject |
ALLOCATION MECHANISMS |
|
dc.subject |
ARREARS |
|
dc.subject |
ATTRITION |
|
dc.subject |
AUTONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
AVERAGE PRODUCTIVITY |
|
dc.subject |
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
BANK CREDITS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK LOANS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK RECAPITALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
BANKRUPTCY |
|
dc.subject |
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS ENTRY |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS PLANS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL STOCK |
|
dc.subject |
CENTRAL BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
CENTRALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
COMMERCIAL BANKING |
|
dc.subject |
COMMERCIAL BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVENESS |
|
dc.subject |
CONSOLIDATION |
|
dc.subject |
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX |
|
dc.subject |
CONSUMER SUBSIDIES |
|
dc.subject |
CONSUMERS |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
COST OF CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
CPI |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT ALLOCATION |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT ALLOCATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT AVAILABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT DECISIONS |
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dc.subject |
CREDIT GUARANTEES |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT LINES |
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dc.subject |
CREDIT MARKETS |
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dc.subject |
CREDIT POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT PROGRAMS |
|
dc.subject |
CREDITS |
|
dc.subject |
CUSTOMER DEMAND |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPMENT POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
DIRECT CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
DIRECTED CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
DIRECTED CREDITS |
|
dc.subject |
DRIVERS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC COOPERATION |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC DYNAMICS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC RECOVERY |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC SECTORS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION |
|
dc.subject |
EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGNS |
|
dc.subject |
EFFECTIVE ALLOCATION |
|
dc.subject |
EMPLOYER |
|
dc.subject |
EMPLOYMENT |
|
dc.subject |
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
ENERGY EFFICIENCY |
|
dc.subject |
ENTERPRISE CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
ENTERPRISE GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
EXCHANGE RATE |
|
dc.subject |
EXCHANGE RATES |
|
dc.subject |
EXPLICIT SUBSIDIES |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT EARNINGS |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL DISTRESS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL SUPPORT |
|
dc.subject |
FISCAL RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
FIXED CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN CURRENCY |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
GDP |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT DIRECTED CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
GREATER ACCESS |
|
dc.subject |
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT |
|
dc.subject |
GROWTH RATE |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH INTEREST RATE |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH INTEREST RATES |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH WAGES |
|
dc.subject |
HOUSEHOLDS |
|
dc.subject |
HOUSING |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES |
|
dc.subject |
INEQUALITY |
|
dc.subject |
INFLATION |
|
dc.subject |
INNOVATION |
|
dc.subject |
INNOVATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
INSTALLMENT |
|
dc.subject |
INTEREST RATES |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
INVENTORIES |
|
dc.subject |
INVENTORY |
|
dc.subject |
INVESTMENT GRANTS |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR MARKET ISSUES |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR MOBILITY |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR MOVEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR REGULATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR SHORTAGES |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR TURNOVER |
|
dc.subject |
LABOUR |
|
dc.subject |
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY |
|
dc.subject |
LEGISLATION |
|
dc.subject |
LENDING POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
LIQUIDATION |
|
dc.subject |
LOAN |
|
dc.subject |
LOCAL GOVERNMENT |
|
dc.subject |
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
MACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
MACROECONOMIC POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
MANDATES |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET DISCIPLINE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET DISTORTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET INEFFICIENCY |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET INSTRUMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
METALS |
|
dc.subject |
MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRY |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL ECONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
NEW ENTRANTS |
|
dc.subject |
OIL |
|
dc.subject |
OIL PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
OUTPUTS |
|
dc.subject |
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE |
|
dc.subject |
PENALTIES |
|
dc.subject |
PERVERSE INCENTIVES |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE CONTROLS |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE INCREASES |
|
dc.subject |
PRIVATIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
PRIVILEGED ACCESS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCERS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCT MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTION PROCESSES |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTIVE ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTIVITY |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTIVITY INCREASES |
|
dc.subject |
PROFIT MARGINS |
|
dc.subject |
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
PROFIT MOTIVE |
|
dc.subject |
PROFITABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
PROFITABLE BUSINESS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SERVICES |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION |
|
dc.subject |
PURCHASING POWER |
|
dc.subject |
PURCHASING POWER PARITY |
|
dc.subject |
REAL GDP |
|
dc.subject |
RECAPITALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
RECESSION |
|
dc.subject |
RENT SEEKING |
|
dc.subject |
RENTS |
|
dc.subject |
REPAYMENT |
|
dc.subject |
RESOURCE ALLOCATION |
|
dc.subject |
SAVINGS |
|
dc.subject |
SKILLED LABOR |
|
dc.subject |
SMALL BUSINESSES |
|
dc.subject |
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
SOURCES OF INCOME |
|
dc.subject |
STATE ENTERPRISES |
|
dc.subject |
STATE SUPPORT |
|
dc.subject |
SUBSIDIARIES |
|
dc.subject |
SUBSIDIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
SUPPLIERS |
|
dc.subject |
SUPPLY CHAINS |
|
dc.subject |
TAX ADMINISTRATION |
|
dc.subject |
TAX CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
TAX EXEMPTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
TAX INCENTIVES |
|
dc.subject |
TAX REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
TAXATION |
|
dc.subject |
TERM CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
TERMS OF TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
TIMBER |
|
dc.subject |
TOTAL COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY |
|
dc.subject |
TOTAL OUTPUT |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSITION ECONOMIES |
|
dc.subject |
UNION |
|
dc.subject |
VALUE ADDED |
|
dc.subject |
WAGE INCREASES |
|
dc.subject |
WAGE POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
WAGES |
|
dc.subject |
WORKING CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
WTO |
|
dc.title |
Belarus - Industrial Performance before and During the Global Crisis : Belarus Economic Policy Notes - Note No. 1 |
|
dc.type |
Economic & Sector Work :: Country Economic Memorandum |
|
dc.coverage |
Europe and Central Asia |
|
dc.coverage |
Europe |
|
dc.coverage |
Eastern Europe |
|
dc.coverage |
Commonwealth of Independent States |
|
dc.coverage |
Belarus |
|