The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines

Hasnain, Zahid; Matsuda, Yasuhiko

dc.creator	Hasnain, Zahid
dc.creator	Matsuda, Yasuhiko
dc.date	2012-03-19T18:03:04Z
dc.date	2012-03-19T18:03:04Z
dc.date	2011-06-01
dc.date.accessioned	2023-02-17T20:57:27Z
dc.date.available	2023-02-17T20:57:27Z
dc.identifier	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110623180935
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3472
dc.identifier.uri	http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244436
dc.description	This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive to "capture" an electric utility and use it for the purposes of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that the level of capture is determined by the incentives of, and the interactions between, local and national politicians, where the concepts of "local" and "national" are context specific. A local politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction lies within the utility s catchment area; by contrast, a national politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction includes two or more utility catchment areas. These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations for local and national politicians: because of "spillover" effects, local politicians have a greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a national politician as they capture only a portion of the political gains from utility performance improvements as some of the benefits of improved service will go to other electoral jurisdictions within the utility s catchment area. The authors posit that three variables impact the magnitude of these incentives of local and national politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents that can be extracted from an electricity cooperative (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local politics; and (iii) the political salience of an electricity cooperative s catchment area for national politicians. The authors illustrate this framework through case studies of specific power utilities, and suggest some policy implications.
dc.language	English
dc.relation	Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5704
dc.rights	CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rights	World Bank
dc.subject	ACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subject	ACCOUNTING
dc.subject	ACTIVISM
dc.subject	ALLOCATION
dc.subject	ANARCHY
dc.subject	AUTONOMY
dc.subject	BIDDING
dc.subject	BUREAUCRACY
dc.subject	BUSINESSMEN
dc.subject	CAPABILITIES
dc.subject	CAPITALISM
dc.subject	CETERIS PARIBUS
dc.subject	CHECKS AND BALANCES
dc.subject	CIVIL SOCIETY
dc.subject	COLLECTIVE ACTION
dc.subject	COLLUSION
dc.subject	COMPETITIVENESS
dc.subject	COMPLAINT
dc.subject	COMPLAINTS
dc.subject	CONFIDENCE
dc.subject	CONSTITUENCY
dc.subject	CONSTITUENTS
dc.subject	CONSUMER GROUPS
dc.subject	CONSUMERS
dc.subject	CORPORATION
dc.subject	CORRUPTION
dc.subject	CRIME
dc.subject	DEMOCRACY
dc.subject	DEVELOPMENT POLICY
dc.subject	DICTATORSHIP
dc.subject	DISCRETION
dc.subject	DYNASTIES
dc.subject	ECONOMIC RENTS
dc.subject	ECONOMICS
dc.subject	ECONOMIES OF SCALE
dc.subject	ELECTIONS
dc.subject	ETHIC
dc.subject	FACTION
dc.subject	FACTIONS
dc.subject	FRAUD
dc.subject	FREEDOM
dc.subject	GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
dc.subject	GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
dc.subject	INITIATIVE
dc.subject	INVESTIGATION
dc.subject	LEADERSHIP
dc.subject	LEGAL FRAMEWORK
dc.subject	LIABILITY
dc.subject	MARGINAL VALUE
dc.subject	MAYORS
dc.subject	MEDIA
dc.subject	MERGERS
dc.subject	MONOPOLY
dc.subject	MORAL HAZARD
dc.subject	NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
dc.subject	PATRONAGE
dc.subject	PEACE
dc.subject	PENALTIES
dc.subject	PERSONAL GAIN
dc.subject	POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
dc.subject	POLITICAL BENEFITS
dc.subject	POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS
dc.subject	POLITICAL CONDITIONS
dc.subject	POLITICAL CULTURE
dc.subject	POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject	POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM
dc.subject	POLITICAL FACTORS
dc.subject	POLITICAL GROUPS
dc.subject	POLITICAL INFLUENCE
dc.subject	POLITICAL INTEREST
dc.subject	POLITICAL INTERESTS
dc.subject	POLITICAL INTERFERENCE
dc.subject	POLITICAL MACHINE
dc.subject	POLITICAL PARTIES
dc.subject	POLITICAL PARTY
dc.subject	POLITICAL POWER
dc.subject	POLITICAL SCIENCE
dc.subject	POLITICIAN
dc.subject	POLITICIANS
dc.subject	POLITICIZATION
dc.subject	PREFERENTIAL
dc.subject	PRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subject	PRIVATIZATION
dc.subject	PROCUREMENT
dc.subject	PROCUREMENTS
dc.subject	PROPERTY RIGHTS
dc.subject	PUBLIC GOOD
dc.subject	PUBLIC GOODS
dc.subject	PUBLIC SERVICES
dc.subject	RENT SEEKING
dc.subject	SAVINGS
dc.subject	SERVICE DELIVERY
dc.subject	SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE
dc.subject	SOCIAL STRUCTURE
dc.subject	STATE POLICIES
dc.subject	TAKEOVER
dc.subject	THEFT
dc.subject	TRANSACTION COSTS
dc.subject	TRANSPARENCY
dc.subject	VIOLENCE
dc.subject	VOTERS
dc.subject	VOTING
dc.subject	WEALTH
dc.title	The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines
dc.type	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
dc.coverage	East Asia and Pacific
dc.coverage	East Asia and Pacific
dc.coverage	Southeast Asia
dc.coverage	Asia
dc.coverage	Philippines