dc.creator |
Ayee, Joseph |
|
dc.creator |
Soreide, Tina |
|
dc.creator |
Shukla, G. P. |
|
dc.creator |
Le, Tuan Minh |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:03:26Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:03:26Z |
|
dc.date |
2011-07-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T20:57:52Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T20:57:52Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110721153754 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3494 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244458 |
|
dc.description |
With a focus on the institutional set-up
and the political environment as central to understanding
and rectifying the poor impact of mining on Ghana's
economic development, this paper highlights the
vulnerabilities in mining sector governance along the
industry value chain. The authors explain why it has been
difficult to implement policies that would have improved
social welfare. They find that incentive problems in
institutions directly or peripherally involved in mining
governance are a major factor, as are an excessively
centralized policy-making process, a powerful executive
president, strong party loyalty, a system of political
patronage, lack of transparency, and weak institutional
capacity at the political and regulatory levels. The paper
argues that the net impact of mining on economic development
is likely to be enhanced with appropriate reforms in
governance. Most importantly, there should be a greater
awareness of incentive problems at the political level and
their possible implications for sector performance and the
economy at large. The set of checks and balances, as
stipulated by the Constitution, have to be reinforced.
Furthermore, capacity building at different levels and
institutions is needed and should be combined with efforts
to enhance incentives for institutional performance. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5730 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
ABUSE |
|
dc.subject |
ABUSES |
|
dc.subject |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTING |
|
dc.subject |
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY |
|
dc.subject |
ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS |
|
dc.subject |
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES |
|
dc.subject |
ANTI-CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
ANTICORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
ANTICORRUPTION LEGISLATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
ANTICORRUPTION PLAN |
|
dc.subject |
APPOINTEES |
|
dc.subject |
ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
AUDITOR |
|
dc.subject |
AUDITS |
|
dc.subject |
AUTHORITY |
|
dc.subject |
BAUXITE |
|
dc.subject |
BEST PRACTICES |
|
dc.subject |
BIDDING |
|
dc.subject |
CASH FLOWS |
|
dc.subject |
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT |
|
dc.subject |
CENTRALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
CITIZENS |
|
dc.subject |
CIVIL SOCIETY |
|
dc.subject |
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
COLLUSION |
|
dc.subject |
COMPLAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
CONFLICT OF INTEREST |
|
dc.subject |
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTITUENCIES |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTITUTION |
|
dc.subject |
CORPORATE TAXES |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPT |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
COUNCILS |
|
dc.subject |
CRIME |
|
dc.subject |
CRONIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
DECENTRALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION MAKERS |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION MAKING |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION-MAKING |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRACIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRACY |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE |
|
dc.subject |
DEREGULATION |
|
dc.subject |
DIAMONDS |
|
dc.subject |
DISCLOSURE |
|
dc.subject |
DISTRICTS |
|
dc.subject |
DIVIDENDS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC SITUATION |
|
dc.subject |
EFFECTIVE USE |
|
dc.subject |
EITI |
|
dc.subject |
ELECTED OFFICIALS |
|
dc.subject |
EMBEZZLEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
EMPLOYMENT GENERATION |
|
dc.subject |
ENACTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION |
|
dc.subject |
EXECUTION |
|
dc.subject |
EXECUTIVE POWER |
|
dc.subject |
EXPENDITURE |
|
dc.subject |
EXPENDITURES |
|
dc.subject |
EXPLOITATION |
|
dc.subject |
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL TRANSFERS |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN EXCHANGE |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
FORESTRY |
|
dc.subject |
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
FRAUD |
|
dc.subject |
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY |
|
dc.subject |
GOLD |
|
dc.subject |
GOLD DEPOSITS |
|
dc.subject |
GOLD MINES |
|
dc.subject |
GOLD MINING |
|
dc.subject |
GOLD PRODUCTION |
|
dc.subject |
GOOD GOVERNANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT'S POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
HEALTH PROBLEMS |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN RESOURCE |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN RIGHTS |
|
dc.subject |
INITIATIVE |
|
dc.subject |
INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS |
|
dc.subject |
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY |
|
dc.subject |
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK |
|
dc.subject |
INTEGRITY |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNAL REVENUE |
|
dc.subject |
INVESTIGATION |
|
dc.subject |
INVESTMENT CLIMATE |
|
dc.subject |
JUDICIARY |
|
dc.subject |
JUSTICE |
|
dc.subject |
KICKBACKS |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR FORCE |
|
dc.subject |
LACK OF COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY |
|
dc.subject |
LAWS |
|
dc.subject |
LEADERSHIP |
|
dc.subject |
LEGAL FRAMEWORK |
|
dc.subject |
LEGAL PROVISIONS |
|
dc.subject |
LEGAL REFORM |
|
dc.subject |
LEGISLATION |
|
dc.subject |
LIABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
LOCAL GOVERNMENT |
|
dc.subject |
MANGANESE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
MEDIA |
|
dc.subject |
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL COMMODITIES |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL COMMODITY |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL EXPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL RESOURCE |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
MINERAL WEALTH |
|
dc.subject |
MINERALS |
|
dc.subject |
MINING AREAS |
|
dc.subject |
MINING COMMUNITIES |
|
dc.subject |
MINING COMPANIES |
|
dc.subject |
MINING GOVERNANCE |
|
dc.subject |
MINING INDUSTRY |
|
dc.subject |
MINING POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
MINING REFORM |
|
dc.subject |
MINING SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
MINING SECTOR REFORMS |
|
dc.subject |
MINISTER |
|
dc.subject |
MINISTERS |
|
dc.subject |
MINISTERS OF STATE |
|
dc.subject |
MINISTRY OF FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
MONOPOLY |
|
dc.subject |
MOTIVATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
MULTINATIONALS |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL ELECTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
NATURAL RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
OFFICEHOLDER |
|
dc.subject |
OIL |
|
dc.subject |
OIL INDUSTRY |
|
dc.subject |
OIL SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
OLD MINES |
|
dc.subject |
PARASTATAL ORGANIZATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
PATRONAGE |
|
dc.subject |
PENALTIES |
|
dc.subject |
PENALTY |
|
dc.subject |
PERSONAL GAINS |
|
dc.subject |
POLICE |
|
dc.subject |
POLICY DECISIONS |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL APPOINTEES |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL ECONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL INSTABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL POWER |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICIAN |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICIANS |
|
dc.subject |
POLLUTION |
|
dc.subject |
POPULISM |
|
dc.subject |
PRESIDENCY |
|
dc.subject |
PRESIDENTS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTION COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTION OF GOLD |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY |
|
dc.subject |
PROPERTY VALUES |
|
dc.subject |
PROSECUTION |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC OFFICIALS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC OPINION |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SERVICE |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK |
|
dc.subject |
REHABILITATION |
|
dc.subject |
REPRESENTATIVES |
|
dc.subject |
RESOURCE CURSE |
|
dc.subject |
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
REVENUE ADMINISTRATION |
|
dc.subject |
REVENUE COLLECTION |
|
dc.subject |
REVENUE MANAGEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
RISK OF CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
ROYALTY |
|
dc.subject |
RULE OF LAW |
|
dc.subject |
RULING PARTY |
|
dc.subject |
RURAL COMMUNITIES |
|
dc.subject |
SALT |
|
dc.subject |
SANCTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
SCANDALS |
|
dc.subject |
SEPARATION OF POWERS |
|
dc.subject |
SERVICE DELIVERIES |
|
dc.subject |
SILVER |
|
dc.subject |
SOCIAL WELFARE |
|
dc.subject |
SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
STATE AGENCIES |
|
dc.subject |
STATE ENTERPRISES |
|
dc.subject |
STATE INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
STATE REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
STATE SECURITY |
|
dc.subject |
STEEL |
|
dc.subject |
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
TAX ADMINISTRATION |
|
dc.subject |
TAX AUDITING |
|
dc.subject |
TAX COLLECTION |
|
dc.subject |
TAX INCENTIVES |
|
dc.subject |
TAX LAW |
|
dc.subject |
TAX PAYMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
TAX RATE |
|
dc.subject |
TAX RATES |
|
dc.subject |
TAX REGIME |
|
dc.subject |
TAX REVENUE |
|
dc.subject |
TAX REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
TAXATION |
|
dc.subject |
TECHNOCRATS |
|
dc.subject |
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS |
|
dc.subject |
VOTING |
|
dc.title |
Political Economy of the Mining Sector in Ghana |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research |
|
dc.coverage |
Africa |
|
dc.coverage |
Africa |
|
dc.coverage |
West Africa |
|
dc.coverage |
Sub-Saharan Africa |
|
dc.coverage |
Ghana |
|