dc.creator |
Lemoyne de Forges, Sabine |
|
dc.creator |
Bibas, Ruben |
|
dc.creator |
Hallegatte, Stephane |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:04:47Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:04:47Z |
|
dc.date |
2011-09-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T20:59:34Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T20:59:34Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110922160728 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3571 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244535 |
|
dc.description |
This paper presents a dynamic model of
the reinsurance market for catastrophe risks. The model is
based on the classical capacity-constraint assumption.
Reinsurers choose every year the quantity of risk they cover
and the level of external capital they raise to cover these
risks. The model exhibits time dependency and reproduces a
market dynamics that shares many features with the real
market. In particular, market price increases and
reinsurance coverage decreases after large shocks, and a
series of smaller losses may have a deeper impact than one
larger loss. There is a significant oligopoly effect
reducing reinsurance supply, and the market is segregated
into strategic large actors that influence market prices and
price-taker smaller firms. A regulation trade-off between
market efficiency and resilience is identified and
quantified: improving the ability of the market to cope with
exceptional events increases the cost of reinsurance. This
model provides an interesting basis to analyze further
capacity needs for the insurance industry in view of growing
worldwide exposure to catastrophic risks and climate change. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5807 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
ADVERSE SELECTION |
|
dc.subject |
AGENTS |
|
dc.subject |
AGGREGATE DEMAND |
|
dc.subject |
ALLOCATION |
|
dc.subject |
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
AMOUNT OF RISK |
|
dc.subject |
ASSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
BANK POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
BANKRUPTCY |
|
dc.subject |
BANKRUPTCY RISK |
|
dc.subject |
BUDGETING |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS RISKS |
|
dc.subject |
BUY BACK |
|
dc.subject |
BUY BACKS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPACITY CONSTRAINT |
|
dc.subject |
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL ALLOCATION |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL MOVEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL STRUCTURE |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITALIZATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
CASUALTY INSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
CATASTROPHE BONDS |
|
dc.subject |
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
CATASTROPHES |
|
dc.subject |
CATASTROPHIC RISKS |
|
dc.subject |
CEDANT |
|
dc.subject |
CEDANTS |
|
dc.subject |
CEDING INSURER |
|
dc.subject |
CLIMATE |
|
dc.subject |
CLIMATE CHANGE |
|
dc.subject |
CLIMATE EXTREMES |
|
dc.subject |
COINSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE |
|
dc.subject |
COST OF CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
COST OF EQUITY |
|
dc.subject |
COST OF REINSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
COVERAGE |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
DEFAULT PROBABILITIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEFAULT PROBABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
DEFAULT RISK |
|
dc.subject |
DEMAND ELASTICITY |
|
dc.subject |
DEMAND FUNCTION |
|
dc.subject |
DISASTERS |
|
dc.subject |
DIVIDEND |
|
dc.subject |
DYNAMIC MODEL |
|
dc.subject |
EARNED PREMIUM |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC GROWTH |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC THEORY |
|
dc.subject |
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE |
|
dc.subject |
EQUITY CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
EXPOSURE |
|
dc.subject |
EXTREME EVENT |
|
dc.subject |
EXTREME EVENTS |
|
dc.subject |
FAIR |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBAL INSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBAL MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBAL REINSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
GUARANTY FUNDS |
|
dc.subject |
HOLDING |
|
dc.subject |
HURRICANE |
|
dc.subject |
HURRICANES |
|
dc.subject |
ILLIQUIDITY |
|
dc.subject |
INDEMNITY |
|
dc.subject |
INSTRUMENT |
|
dc.subject |
INSURANCE COMPANIES |
|
dc.subject |
INSURANCE INDUSTRY |
|
dc.subject |
INSURANCE MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
INSURANCE REGULATION |
|
dc.subject |
INSURANCE SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
INSURED LOSSES |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
IPO |
|
dc.subject |
LIABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
LIABILITY SIDE |
|
dc.subject |
LIMITED LIABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
LONG-TERM COST |
|
dc.subject |
LOWER PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET BEHAVIOR |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET CAP |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET CAPITALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET CONDITIONS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET DATA |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET DEMAND |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET EFFICIENCY |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET POWER |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PRICE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET RISK |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET RISKS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET SEGMENTATION |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET SHARE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET SHARES |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET STRUCTURE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET SUPPLY |
|
dc.subject |
MORAL HAZARD |
|
dc.subject |
NATURAL DISASTERS |
|
dc.subject |
OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
OLIGOPOLY |
|
dc.subject |
OUTPUT |
|
dc.subject |
OUTPUTS |
|
dc.subject |
PERFECT INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
POLICYHOLDERS |
|
dc.subject |
PORTFOLIO |
|
dc.subject |
PREMIUMS |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE INCREASES |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE INDEX |
|
dc.subject |
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT |
|
dc.subject |
PROBABILITY OF DEFAULTS |
|
dc.subject |
PROGRAMS |
|
dc.subject |
PROPORTIONAL REINSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
RATE OF RETURN |
|
dc.subject |
RATES |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATOR |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY CONSTRAINT |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
REINSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
REINSURANCE CAPACITY |
|
dc.subject |
REINSURANCE COMPANIES |
|
dc.subject |
REINSURANCE CONTRACTS |
|
dc.subject |
REINSURANCE MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
REINSURERS |
|
dc.subject |
RETROCESSION |
|
dc.subject |
RETURN |
|
dc.subject |
RISK AVERSION |
|
dc.subject |
RISK EVALUATION |
|
dc.subject |
RISK MANAGEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
RISK MANAGEMENT TOOL |
|
dc.subject |
RISK OF DEFAULT |
|
dc.subject |
RISK PREMIUM |
|
dc.subject |
RISK SHARING |
|
dc.subject |
RISK-FREE INVESTMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
SCENARIOS |
|
dc.subject |
SECURITIES |
|
dc.subject |
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES |
|
dc.subject |
SHAREHOLDER |
|
dc.subject |
SHAREHOLDERS |
|
dc.subject |
SOLVENCY |
|
dc.subject |
STORM SURGE |
|
dc.subject |
SURPLUS |
|
dc.subject |
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
SYSTEMIC RISK |
|
dc.subject |
TREATIES |
|
dc.subject |
TREATY |
|
dc.subject |
UNDERWRITING |
|
dc.title |
A Dynamic Model of Extreme Risk Coverage : Resilience and Efficiency in the Global Reinsurance Market |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|