dc.creator |
Gawande, Kishore |
|
dc.creator |
Hoekman, Bernard |
|
dc.creator |
Cui, Yue |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:05:50Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:05:50Z |
|
dc.date |
2011-10-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T21:00:39Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T21:00:39Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20111031093440 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3628 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244592 |
|
dc.description |
The collapse in trade and contraction of
output that occurred during 2008-09 was comparable to, and
in many countries more severe than, the Great Depression of
1930, but did not give rise to the rampant protectionism
that followed the Great Crash. Theory suggests several
hypotheses for why it was not in the interest of many firms
to lobby for protection, including much greater
macroeconomic "policy space" today, the rise of
intra-industry trade (specialization in specific varieties),
and the fragmentation of production across global value
chains ("vertical" specialization and the
associated growth of trade in intermediates). Institutions
may also have played a role in limiting the extent of
protectionist responses. World Trade Organization
disciplines raise the cost of using trade policies for
member countries and have proved to be a stable foundation
for the open multilateral trading system that has been built
over the last fifty years. This paper empirically examines
the power of these and other theories to explain the
observed pattern of trade policy responses to the 2008
crisis, using trade and protection data for seven large
emerging market countries that have a history of active use
of trade policy. Vertical specialization (global
fragmentation) is found to be the most powerful economic
factor determining trade policy responses. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5862 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS |
|
dc.subject |
AGRICULTURE |
|
dc.subject |
ANTI-DUMPING INVESTIGATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
ANTIDUMPING |
|
dc.subject |
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES |
|
dc.subject |
APPLIED TARIFF |
|
dc.subject |
AVERAGE TARIFF |
|
dc.subject |
BARRIERS TO TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
BILATERAL IMPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
BILATERAL TARIFF |
|
dc.subject |
BILATERAL TARIFFS |
|
dc.subject |
BILATERAL TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
BILATERAL TRADE DATA |
|
dc.subject |
COMMERCIAL POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVE POSITION |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVENESS |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE |
|
dc.subject |
CONSUMERS |
|
dc.subject |
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN |
|
dc.subject |
CURRENCY |
|
dc.subject |
CURRENCY APPRECIATION |
|
dc.subject |
CURRENT ACCOUNT |
|
dc.subject |
CUSTOMS |
|
dc.subject |
CUSTOMS UNIONS |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
DEMAND ELASTICITIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEMAND ELASTICITY |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEVALUATION |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPMENT POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC CONSUMERS |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC INDUSTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC PRODUCERS |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC PRODUCTION |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC SUPPLIERS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC RESEARCH |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC THEORY |
|
dc.subject |
ELASTICITY OF TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
EMERGING MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
EXCHANGE RATES |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORT SUPPLY |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORTERS |
|
dc.subject |
EXPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
EXTERNALITY |
|
dc.subject |
FINAL GOODS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL CRISIS |
|
dc.subject |
FIXED COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN FIRM |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN FIRMS |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN PRODUCERS |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN PRODUCTS |
|
dc.subject |
FREE TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
FREE-TRADE AGREEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
FUTURE RESEARCH |
|
dc.subject |
GDP |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBAL TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBAL TRADING |
|
dc.subject |
GLOBALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
GROSS EXPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
GROSS OUTPUT |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH TARIFFS |
|
dc.subject |
HOME COUNTRY |
|
dc.subject |
HOME GOVERNMENT |
|
dc.subject |
HOME GOVERNMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
HOME TARIFFS |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
IMPERFECT COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
IMPORT PENETRATION |
|
dc.subject |
IMPORT PROTECTION |
|
dc.subject |
IMPORT QUOTAS |
|
dc.subject |
INCREASING RETURNS |
|
dc.subject |
INDUSTRIAL POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION |
|
dc.subject |
INDUSTRY TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
INPUT-OUTPUT TABLES |
|
dc.subject |
INTERMEDIATE GOODS |
|
dc.subject |
INTERMEDIATE INPUTS |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL RULES |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
INVESTOR CONFIDENCE |
|
dc.subject |
LEVEL OF PROTECTION |
|
dc.subject |
LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
LIQUIDITY |
|
dc.subject |
LIQUIDITY CONSTRAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
LOBBYING |
|
dc.subject |
LOW INTEREST RATES |
|
dc.subject |
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET ACCESS |
|
dc.subject |
MEMBER COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
MEMBER GOVERNMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
MERCANTILISM |
|
dc.subject |
MONETARY POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
MONETARY POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
MONOPOLY |
|
dc.subject |
MULTILATERAL LIBERALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION |
|
dc.subject |
MULTILATERAL TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
MULTINATIONAL FIRMS |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL BUREAU |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL TREATMENT |
|
dc.subject |
OPEN MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
OPEN TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
OPTIMAL TARIFF |
|
dc.subject |
OPTIMAL TARIFFS |
|
dc.subject |
PATTERN OF TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
PERFECT COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
POLICY RESPONSES |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL ECONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL RATE |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL RATES |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL TARIFF |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE OF IMPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTION INCREASES |
|
dc.subject |
PROTECTION DATA |
|
dc.subject |
PROTECTION FOR SALE |
|
dc.subject |
PROTECTIONISM |
|
dc.subject |
PROTECTIONIST |
|
dc.subject |
PROTECTIONIST PRESSURES |
|
dc.subject |
REAL EXCHANGE RATE |
|
dc.subject |
RECIPROCITY |
|
dc.subject |
REGIONAL TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
RISK PREMIUM |
|
dc.subject |
RULES OF NEGOTIATION |
|
dc.subject |
SAFEGUARD ACTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
SAFEGUARD MEASURES |
|
dc.subject |
SPECIALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF BINDINGS |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF COMMITMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF DATA |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF EQUIVALENT |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF INCREASE |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF INCREASES |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF LEVELS |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF LINES |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF ON IMPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF PREFERENCES |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF PROTECTION |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF RATE |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF RATES |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF REVENUE |
|
dc.subject |
TARIFF STRUCTURE |
|
dc.subject |
TERMS OF TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE AGREEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE ALERT |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE BARRIERS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE CONCESSIONS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE COOPERATION |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE DISTORTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE EFFECTS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE EXTERNALITIES |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE FLOWS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE MODELS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE POLICY INSTRUMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE POLICY REVIEW |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE POLICY REVIEW MECHANISM |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE REFORMS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE RELATIONSHIPS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE RESTRICTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE ROUNDS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE VOLUMES |
|
dc.subject |
TRADE WARS |
|
dc.subject |
TRADING PARTNERS |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPORT COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
UNEMPLOYMENT |
|
dc.subject |
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES |
|
dc.subject |
UNILATERAL LIBERALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
URUGUAY ROUND |
|
dc.subject |
VALUE ADDED |
|
dc.subject |
VALUE OF TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
WELFARE GAINS |
|
dc.subject |
WORLD TRADE |
|
dc.subject |
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
WTO |
|
dc.subject |
ZERO TARIFFS |
|
dc.subject |
ZERO TARIFFS |
|
dc.title |
Determinants of Trade Policy Responses to the 2008 Financial Crisis |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|