Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities?

Kraay, Aart; Tawara, Norikazu

dc.creator	Kraay, Aart
dc.creator	Tawara, Norikazu
dc.date	2012-03-19T18:39:04Z
dc.date	2012-03-19T18:39:04Z
dc.date	2010-03-01
dc.date.accessioned	2023-02-17T21:02:48Z
dc.date.available	2023-02-17T21:02:48Z
dc.identifier	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100331142656
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3746
dc.identifier.uri	http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244710
dc.description	Many highly-disaggregated cross-country indicators of institutional quality and the business environment have been developed in recent years. The promise of these indicators is that they can be used to identify specific reform priorities that policymakers and aid donors can target in their efforts to improve institutional and regulatory quality outcomes. Doing so however requires evidence on the partial effects of these many very detailed variables on outcomes of interest, for example, investor perceptions of corruption or the quality of the regulatory environment. In this paper we use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to systematically document the partial correlations between disaggregated indicators and several closely-related outcome variables of interest using two leading datasets: the Global Integrity Index and the Doing Business indicators. We find major instability across outcomes and across levels of disaggregation in the set of indicators identified by BMA as important determinants of outcomes. Disaggregated indicators that are important determinants of one outcome are on average not important determinants of other very similar outcomes. And for a given outcome variable, indicators that are important at one level of disaggregation are on average not important at other levels of disaggregation. These findings illustrate the difficulties in using highly-disaggregated indicators to identify reform priorities.
dc.language	English
dc.relation	Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5254
dc.rights	CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rights	World Bank
dc.subject	ACCESS TO INFORMATION
dc.subject	ACCOUNTABILITY
dc.subject	ADDITIONAL REGRESSORS
dc.subject	ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
dc.subject	AGGREGATE INDICATOR
dc.subject	AGGREGATE INDICATORS
dc.subject	ALGORITHMS
dc.subject	ANTICORRUPTION
dc.subject	BENCHMARK
dc.subject	BRIBERY
dc.subject	BUREAUCRACY
dc.subject	BUSINESS CLIMATE
dc.subject	BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
dc.subject	CAPITAL MARKETS
dc.subject	CAUSAL EFFECT
dc.subject	CAUSATION
dc.subject	CITIZEN
dc.subject	CITIZEN PARTICIPATION
dc.subject	CITIZENS
dc.subject	CIVIL SOCIETY
dc.subject	COMMERCIAL RISK RATING AGENCIES
dc.subject	COMPETITIVENESS
dc.subject	CORRELATIONS
dc.subject	CORRUPT OFFICIALS
dc.subject	CORRUPTION
dc.subject	CORRUPTION TRENDS
dc.subject	CORRUPTION VARIABLES
dc.subject	COUNTRY COVERAGE
dc.subject	DEGREES OF FREEDOM
dc.subject	DEPENDENT VARIABLE
dc.subject	DEPENDENT VARIABLES
dc.subject	ECONOMETRICS
dc.subject	ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
dc.subject	ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject	ECONOMIC GROWTH
dc.subject	ECONOMICS
dc.subject	ECONOMISTS
dc.subject	EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
dc.subject	EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
dc.subject	ENVIRONMENTAL
dc.subject	ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
dc.subject	ENVIRONMENTS
dc.subject	ERROR TERM
dc.subject	EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
dc.subject	FINANCIAL HONESTY
dc.subject	FINITE SAMPLES
dc.subject	FOREIGN AID
dc.subject	FOREIGN INVESTORS
dc.subject	FORMAL ANALYSIS
dc.subject	GDP
dc.subject	GDP PER CAPITA
dc.subject	GOOD GOVERNANCE
dc.subject	GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES
dc.subject	GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
dc.subject	GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
dc.subject	GOVERNANCE OUTCOMES
dc.subject	GOVERNANCE REFORM
dc.subject	GROWTH RATES
dc.subject	GROWTH REGRESSION
dc.subject	GROWTH THEORIES
dc.subject	IMPORT BARRIERS
dc.subject	IMPROVING GOVERNANCE
dc.subject	INCOME
dc.subject	INCOME DISTRIBUTION
dc.subject	INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES
dc.subject	INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY
dc.subject	INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
dc.subject	INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATION
dc.subject	INVESTMENT CLIMATE
dc.subject	JOURNAL OF ECONOMETRICS
dc.subject	JUDICIAL DECISIONS
dc.subject	LARGE NUMBER
dc.subject	LEADING INDICATORS
dc.subject	LINEAR REGRESSION
dc.subject	MACROECONOMIC STABILITY
dc.subject	MACROECONOMICS
dc.subject	MATRIX
dc.subject	MEASUREMENT ERROR
dc.subject	MEASURING CORRUPTION
dc.subject	MODEL SPECIFICATION
dc.subject	MONOPOLY
dc.subject	NORMAL DENSITY
dc.subject	0 HYPOTHESIS
dc.subject	NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
dc.subject	NUMBER OF REGRESSORS
dc.subject	NUMBER OF VARIABLES
dc.subject	PANEL DATA
dc.subject	PARSIMONIOUS MODELS
dc.subject	POLITICAL FINANCING
dc.subject	POLITICAL SYSTEM
dc.subject	POSITIVE CORRELATION
dc.subject	PRICE CONTROLS
dc.subject	PROBABILITIES
dc.subject	PROBABILITY
dc.subject	PUBLIC CONTRACTS
dc.subject	PUBLIC FUNDS
dc.subject	PUBLIC INFORMATION
dc.subject	PUBLIC OFFICIALS
dc.subject	PUBLIC UTILITIES
dc.subject	RANDOM VARIABLE
dc.subject	REGULATORY OUTCOMES
dc.subject	REGULATORY POLICY
dc.subject	REGULATORY QUALITY
dc.subject	REVERSE CAUSATION
dc.subject	RULE OF LAW
dc.subject	SAMPLE SIZE
dc.subject	SET OF VARIABLES
dc.subject	SLOPE COEFFICIENT
dc.subject	SLOPE COEFFICIENTS
dc.subject	SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS
dc.subject	STANDARD DEVIATION
dc.subject	STANDARD DEVIATIONS
dc.subject	STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
dc.subject	SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTS
dc.subject	TAX COLLECTION
dc.subject	TAX SYSTEM
dc.subject	TRADE POLICY
dc.subject	TRANSPARENCY
dc.subject	UNIT INCREASE
dc.subject	WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS
dc.title	Can Disaggregated Indicators Identify Governance Reform Priorities?
dc.type	Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
dc.coverage	The World Region
dc.coverage	The World Region