dc.creator |
Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli |
|
dc.creator |
Huizinga, Harry |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:40:48Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:40:48Z |
|
dc.date |
2010-07-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T21:04:36Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T21:04:36Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20100719151708 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3844 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244808 |
|
dc.description |
Deteriorating public finances around the
world raise doubts about countries' abilities to bail
out their largest banks. For an international sample of
banks, this paper investigates the impact of government
indebtedness and deficits on bank stock prices and credit
default swap spreads. Overall, bank stock prices reflect a
negative capitalization of government debt and they respond
negatively to deficits. The authors present evidence that in
2008 systemically large banks saw a reduction in their
market valuation in countries running large fiscal deficits.
Furthermore, the change in bank credit default swap spreads
in 2008 relative to 2007 reflects countries'
deterioration of public deficits. The results of the
analysis suggest that some systemically important banks can
increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, as they
have become too big to save, potentially reversing the trend
to ever larger banks. The paper also documents that a
smaller proportion of banks are systemically important --
relative to gross domestic product -- in 2008 than in the
two previous years, which could reflect private incentives
to downsize. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research Working Paper ; No. 5360 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTING |
|
dc.subject |
ADVISORY SERVICES |
|
dc.subject |
ASSETS RATIO |
|
dc.subject |
AVERAGE COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
BAD CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
BAILOUT |
|
dc.subject |
BALANCE SHEETS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK ASSET |
|
dc.subject |
BANK ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK BONDS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
BANK CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
BANK CREDITORS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK DEPOSITS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK FAILURE |
|
dc.subject |
BANK FAILURES |
|
dc.subject |
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK LIABILITIES |
|
dc.subject |
BANK LIABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
BANK MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
BANK MERGERS |
|
dc.subject |
BANK PROFITABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
BANK REGULATION |
|
dc.subject |
BANK RISK |
|
dc.subject |
BANK SIZE |
|
dc.subject |
BANK VALUATION |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING CORPORATION |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING CRISES |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING CRISIS |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING INDUSTRY |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING SYSTEMS |
|
dc.subject |
BANKRUPTCY |
|
dc.subject |
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS |
|
dc.subject |
BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
BENCHMARK |
|
dc.subject |
BENCHMARKS |
|
dc.subject |
BOND |
|
dc.subject |
BOND HOLDERS |
|
dc.subject |
BOND MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
BOND MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
BOND YIELD |
|
dc.subject |
BONDS |
|
dc.subject |
BOOK VALUE |
|
dc.subject |
BORROWING |
|
dc.subject |
BORROWING CAPACITY |
|
dc.subject |
BUDGET BALANCE |
|
dc.subject |
BUDGET BALANCES |
|
dc.subject |
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS CYCLE |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL REGULATION |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
CAPITALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
CDS |
|
dc.subject |
CENTRAL BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
CHECKS |
|
dc.subject |
CLAIM |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES |
|
dc.subject |
CONTINGENT CLAIM |
|
dc.subject |
CONTINGENT LIABILITIES |
|
dc.subject |
CORPORATE YIELD |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT DEFAULT |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT DERIVATIVES |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT LOSSES |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT QUALITY |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT RATING |
|
dc.subject |
CURRENCY |
|
dc.subject |
DEBENTURE |
|
dc.subject |
DEBENTURE HOLDERS |
|
dc.subject |
DEBENTURES |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT ISSUES |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT RATIO |
|
dc.subject |
DEFAULT RISK |
|
dc.subject |
DEFICITS |
|
dc.subject |
DEPENDENT |
|
dc.subject |
DEPOSIT |
|
dc.subject |
DEPOSIT INSTITUTION |
|
dc.subject |
DEPOSIT INSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
DEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEME |
|
dc.subject |
DEPOSIT LIABILITIES |
|
dc.subject |
DISTRESSED BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
DIVIDEND |
|
dc.subject |
DOMESTIC BANK |
|
dc.subject |
DUMMY VARIABLE |
|
dc.subject |
DUMMY VARIABLES |
|
dc.subject |
EARNING ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
EARNINGS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC CRISIS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC RENTS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIES OF SCALE |
|
dc.subject |
EMERGING MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES |
|
dc.subject |
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
EXPECTED RETURNS |
|
dc.subject |
EXPLICIT DEPOSIT INSURANCE |
|
dc.subject |
EXTERNALITIES |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL CRISIS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL SAFETY |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL STUDIES |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL SUPPORT |
|
dc.subject |
FISCAL AUTHORITIES |
|
dc.subject |
FISCAL BALANCE |
|
dc.subject |
FISCAL BALANCES |
|
dc.subject |
FISCAL DEFICITS |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN BANK |
|
dc.subject |
FUTURE FINANCIAL CRISIS |
|
dc.subject |
GDP |
|
dc.subject |
GDP PER CAPITA |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT DEFICITS |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT FINANCES |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT INDEBTEDNESS |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
HOLDINGS |
|
dc.subject |
IMPLICIT SUBSIDIES |
|
dc.subject |
IMPLICIT SUBSIDY |
|
dc.subject |
INDEBTED |
|
dc.subject |
INDEBTED COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
INDIVIDUAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
INDIVIDUAL BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
INFORMATION ON CREDIT |
|
dc.subject |
INSIDER TRADING |
|
dc.subject |
INSOLVENCY |
|
dc.subject |
INSURED DEPOSITS |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANKING |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
INVESTMENT BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
LARGE BANK |
|
dc.subject |
LARGE BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
LEADING INDICATORS |
|
dc.subject |
LEVERAGE |
|
dc.subject |
LIABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
LIQUIDITY |
|
dc.subject |
LOSSES ON BANK |
|
dc.subject |
LOSSES ON BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET DISCIPLINE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET VALUE |
|
dc.subject |
MATURITY |
|
dc.subject |
MERGER |
|
dc.subject |
MONETARY POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
MORAL HAZARD |
|
dc.subject |
MORTGAGE |
|
dc.subject |
MORTGAGE LOANS |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL ECONOMIES |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL ECONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES |
|
dc.subject |
NUMBER OF BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
POSITIVE COEFFICIENT |
|
dc.subject |
POSITIVE COEFFICIENTS |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE DISCOVERY |
|
dc.subject |
PROFITABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC BUDGET |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC DEBTS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC FINANCES |
|
dc.subject |
PUT OPTION |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY FORBEARANCE |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY RESTRICTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
REORGANIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
RETURN |
|
dc.subject |
RETURN ON ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
RETURNS |
|
dc.subject |
RISK DIVERSIFICATION |
|
dc.subject |
RISK EXPOSURE |
|
dc.subject |
RISK PROFILE |
|
dc.subject |
SAFETY NET |
|
dc.subject |
SECURITIES |
|
dc.subject |
SHAREHOLDER |
|
dc.subject |
SHAREHOLDER VALUE |
|
dc.subject |
SHAREHOLDERS |
|
dc.subject |
SMALL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
SMALL BANKS |
|
dc.subject |
SOLVENCY |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK RETURN |
|
dc.subject |
STOCK RETURNS |
|
dc.subject |
SUBORDINATED DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
SUBSIDIARIES |
|
dc.subject |
SUBSIDIARY |
|
dc.subject |
SWAP MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES |
|
dc.subject |
TAKEOVER |
|
dc.subject |
TAX |
|
dc.subject |
TAXATION |
|
dc.subject |
TRADING |
|
dc.subject |
UNION |
|
dc.subject |
VALUATION |
|
dc.subject |
WEALTH |
|
dc.subject |
WEALTH EFFECT |
|
dc.subject |
WEALTH EFFECTS |
|
dc.subject |
WINDING-UP |
|
dc.subject |
YIELD SPREADS |
|
dc.title |
Are Banks Too Big to Fail or Too Big to Save? International Evidence from Equity Prices and CDS Spreads |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|