dc.creator |
Benitez, Daniel |
|
dc.creator |
Estache, Antonio |
|
dc.creator |
Soreide, Tina |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:42:31Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:42:31Z |
|
dc.date |
2010-10-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T21:06:18Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T21:06:18Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101025084550 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3938 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244908 |
|
dc.description |
Policy recommendations for
infrastructure provision usually build on a well-established
understanding of best practice for sector governance. Too
rarely are they adapted to the country-specific political
environment even if this is an area where policy choices are
likely to be subject to private agendas in politics. The
fact that such private agendas are often ignored goes a long
way toward explaining why infrastructure policies fail and
why best practice can be counterproductive. While
non-benevolence and rent-seeking are well described in the
literature and anecdotes abound, there is only limited
consideration of how the different incentive problems in
politics impede policy improvements in infrastructure. This
paper addresses why politics in infrastructure cannot be
ignored, drawing on theoretical results and a systematic
review of experiences. It reviews how different private
agendas in politics will have different impacts for
sector-governance decisions -- and hence service delivery.
The concept of best practice in policy recommendations
should be reconsidered in a wide perspective and allow for
tailored solutions based on an understanding of the given
incentive problems. Policy recommendations should take into
account how coordination trade-offs may complicate efforts
to reduce the possible impact of private agendas on
infrastructure policy decisions. Although more transparency
linked to service delivery indicators is a "safe"
recommendation, it is also clear that the demand for good
governance will not be sufficient to secure political
accountability in a sector with huge vested interests
combined with complicated funding schemes and complex contracts. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5455 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
ACCESS TO INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTING |
|
dc.subject |
AIRPORTS |
|
dc.subject |
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
ANTI-CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
BASIC SERVICE |
|
dc.subject |
BEST PRACTICE |
|
dc.subject |
BEST PRACTICES |
|
dc.subject |
BRIBE |
|
dc.subject |
BRIBERY |
|
dc.subject |
BRIBES |
|
dc.subject |
BUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
CASH TRANSFERS |
|
dc.subject |
CITIZEN |
|
dc.subject |
CIVIL SERVANTS |
|
dc.subject |
CIVIL SOCIETY |
|
dc.subject |
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
COLLUSION |
|
dc.subject |
COMMON LAW |
|
dc.subject |
CONDITIONALITY |
|
dc.subject |
CONGESTION |
|
dc.subject |
CONGESTION PRICING |
|
dc.subject |
CONSENSUS |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTITUENCY |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTITUTION |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTRUCTION COMPANIES |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPT |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPT OFFICIALS |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPT POLITICIANS |
|
dc.subject |
CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
CRIMINAL |
|
dc.subject |
CRONIES |
|
dc.subject |
DATA COLLECTION |
|
dc.subject |
DECENTRALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION MAKING |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION-MAKERS |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION-MAKING |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES |
|
dc.subject |
DECREES |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRACIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRACY |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRATIC REGIMES |
|
dc.subject |
DEMOCRATIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
DEREGULATION |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
DICTATORSHIP |
|
dc.subject |
DISCLOSURE |
|
dc.subject |
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
DRIVERS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMICS |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMISTS |
|
dc.subject |
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE |
|
dc.subject |
EMPIRICAL INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
EMPIRICAL STUDIES |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTAL |
|
dc.subject |
ENVIRONMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
EXECUTIVE POWER |
|
dc.subject |
EXPENDITURES |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
FISCAL RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN INVESTORS |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP |
|
dc.subject |
FOREIGN POLICY |
|
dc.subject |
FRAUD |
|
dc.subject |
FREE PRESS |
|
dc.subject |
FREEDOM OF SPEECH |
|
dc.subject |
FUEL |
|
dc.subject |
FUEL COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
GOOD GOVERNANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNANCE INDICATORS |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNANCE PERFORMANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNANCE REFORMS |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT LEVEL |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT STATISTICS |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT |
|
dc.subject |
HIGHWAYS |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
HUMAN RIGHTS |
|
dc.subject |
IDEOLOGIES |
|
dc.subject |
INEQUALITY |
|
dc.subject |
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
INFRASTRUCTURE POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS |
|
dc.subject |
INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM |
|
dc.subject |
INITIATIVE |
|
dc.subject |
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY |
|
dc.subject |
JUDICIARY |
|
dc.subject |
JUSTICE |
|
dc.subject |
LABOR UNIONS |
|
dc.subject |
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
LAWS |
|
dc.subject |
LEADERSHIP |
|
dc.subject |
LEGAL FRAMEWORK |
|
dc.subject |
LEGISLATION |
|
dc.subject |
LOBBYING |
|
dc.subject |
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET POWER |
|
dc.subject |
MEDIA |
|
dc.subject |
MINISTER |
|
dc.subject |
MINISTERS |
|
dc.subject |
MONOPOLIES |
|
dc.subject |
MONOPOLY |
|
dc.subject |
MOTIVATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONAL LEVEL |
|
dc.subject |
NATIONALIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
NATURAL RESOURCES |
|
dc.subject |
PARLIAMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PATRONAGE |
|
dc.subject |
PETTY CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
POLICY DECISIONS |
|
dc.subject |
POLICY INTERVENTION |
|
dc.subject |
POLICY MAKERS |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL AGENDA |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL AUTHORITY |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL CONTROL |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL ECONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL INFLUENCE |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL INTERFERENCE |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL LEADERS |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL PARTIES |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL POWER |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL RISK |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICIAN |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICIANS |
|
dc.subject |
POPULISM |
|
dc.subject |
PORK BARREL |
|
dc.subject |
POTENTIAL INVESTORS |
|
dc.subject |
PRESENT VALUE |
|
dc.subject |
PRESIDENTS |
|
dc.subject |
PRIME MINISTER |
|
dc.subject |
PRIVATIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
PROCUREMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCTION COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
PROPAGANDA |
|
dc.subject |
PROPERTY RIGHTS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC FINANCING |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC GOOD |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC GOODS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC HEARINGS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC INVESTMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC OPINION |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SERVICE |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY AGENCY |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY AUTHORITY |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY BODY |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY CAPTURE |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
REGULATORY MEASURES |
|
dc.subject |
RESEARCH AGENDA |
|
dc.subject |
RESOURCE CURSE |
|
dc.subject |
RISK OF CORRUPTION |
|
dc.subject |
ROAD |
|
dc.subject |
ROAD MAINTENANCE |
|
dc.subject |
ROADS |
|
dc.subject |
SANCTION |
|
dc.subject |
SANCTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
SANITATION |
|
dc.subject |
SECTORAL POLICIES |
|
dc.subject |
SECURITIES |
|
dc.subject |
SEPARATION OF POWERS |
|
dc.subject |
SERVICE DELIVERY |
|
dc.subject |
SOCIAL COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
SOCIAL PROGRAM |
|
dc.subject |
SOVEREIGNTY |
|
dc.subject |
STATE REVENUES |
|
dc.subject |
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES |
|
dc.subject |
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
TAX |
|
dc.subject |
TAX BASE |
|
dc.subject |
TAX BURDEN |
|
dc.subject |
TAX REGIME |
|
dc.subject |
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS |
|
dc.subject |
THEFT |
|
dc.subject |
TOLL |
|
dc.subject |
TOLL ROADS |
|
dc.subject |
TRAFFIC |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPARENCY |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPORT |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPORT SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPORT SERVICES |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPORTATION |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
TRUE |
|
dc.subject |
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES |
|
dc.subject |
URBAN TRANSPORT |
|
dc.subject |
VESTED INTERESTS |
|
dc.subject |
VOTING |
|
dc.subject |
WAGES |
|
dc.subject |
WEALTH |
|
dc.subject |
WHITE ELEPHANTS |
|
dc.subject |
WILLINGNESS TO PAY |
|
dc.title |
Dealing with Politics for Money and Power in Infrastructure |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|