dc.creator |
Bieta, Volker |
|
dc.creator |
Milde, Hellmuth |
|
dc.creator |
Weber, Nadine |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:43:17Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T18:43:17Z |
|
dc.date |
2010-12-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T21:07:01Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T21:07:01Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20101208092950 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3980 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/244950 |
|
dc.description |
The authors of this paper claim that
modeling financial markets based on probability theory is a
severe systematic mistake that led to the global financial
crisis. They argue that the crisis was not just the result
of risk managers using outdated financial data, but that the
employed efficiency model -- also referred to as the
stochastic model -- is basically flawed. In an exemplary
way, the analysis proves that this model is unable to
account for interactions between market participants,
neglects strategic interdependences, and hence leads to
erroneous solutions. The central message is that the
existing efficiency model should be replaced by an approach
using agent-based scenario analysis. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5498 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
ACCOUNTING |
|
dc.subject |
AGENCY PROBLEMS |
|
dc.subject |
AMOUNT OF CAPITAL |
|
dc.subject |
ASYMMETRIES OF INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING INDUSTRY |
|
dc.subject |
BANKING SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
BENEFICIARY |
|
dc.subject |
CASH FLOW |
|
dc.subject |
CASH FLOWS |
|
dc.subject |
COLLATERAL |
|
dc.subject |
COLLATERALS |
|
dc.subject |
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST |
|
dc.subject |
CORPORATE FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIT CONTRACT |
|
dc.subject |
CREDITOR |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT |
|
dc.subject |
DEBT FINANCING |
|
dc.subject |
DEBTOR |
|
dc.subject |
DECISION MAKING |
|
dc.subject |
DERIVATIVE |
|
dc.subject |
DERIVATIVES |
|
dc.subject |
ECONOMICS |
|
dc.subject |
EFFICIENT MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
EFFICIENT OUTCOMES |
|
dc.subject |
EQUITY FINANCING |
|
dc.subject |
FEDERAL REGULATORS |
|
dc.subject |
FEDERAL RESERVE |
|
dc.subject |
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL ASSET |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL ASSETS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL CRISIS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL DATA |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCIAL MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
FREE MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
FUTURE CASH FLOWS |
|
dc.subject |
GAME THEORY |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT REFORM |
|
dc.subject |
HIGH INTEREST RATE |
|
dc.subject |
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY |
|
dc.subject |
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY |
|
dc.subject |
INTEREST RATE |
|
dc.subject |
INTEREST RATES |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
LOW INTEREST RATE |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PARTICIPANT |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PARTICIPANTS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
MATURITY |
|
dc.subject |
NASH EQUILIBRIUM |
|
dc.subject |
PERFECT COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
PERFECT MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
PORTFOLIO |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE TAKERS |
|
dc.subject |
RANDOM WALK |
|
dc.subject |
REAL ESTATE |
|
dc.subject |
RESOURCE MOBILIZATION |
|
dc.subject |
RISK NEUTRAL |
|
dc.subject |
STATISTICAL DATA |
|
dc.subject |
SUBVENTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
WEALTH |
|
dc.title |
A Flaw in the Model… That Defines How the World Works |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|