dc.creator |
Estache, Antonio |
|
dc.creator |
Iimi, Atsushi |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T19:09:06Z |
|
dc.date |
2012-03-19T19:09:06Z |
|
dc.date |
2009-03-01 |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2023-02-17T21:08:17Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2023-02-17T21:08:17Z |
|
dc.identifier |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718 |
|
dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4051 |
|
dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/245021 |
|
dc.description |
Limited competition has been a serious
concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however,
there are normally a number of potential bidders initially
showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on
tackling the question why these initially interested bidders
fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out
firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the
process at the beginning of the tendering or may be
technically disqualified at any point in the selection
process. This paper applies the double selection model to
procurement data from road development projects in
developing countries and examines why competition ends up
restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and
auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on
the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would
likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs. |
|
dc.language |
English |
|
dc.relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4855 |
|
dc.rights |
CC BY 3.0 IGO |
|
dc.rights |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ |
|
dc.rights |
World Bank |
|
dc.subject |
AFFILIATED |
|
dc.subject |
AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS |
|
dc.subject |
AUCTION |
|
dc.subject |
AUCTION MARKETS |
|
dc.subject |
AUCTION PROCESS |
|
dc.subject |
AUCTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
BID |
|
dc.subject |
BID EVALUATION |
|
dc.subject |
BID EVALUATION STAGE |
|
dc.subject |
BID PRICE |
|
dc.subject |
BIDDER |
|
dc.subject |
BIDDERS |
|
dc.subject |
BIDDING |
|
dc.subject |
BIDDING DOCUMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
BIDS |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP |
|
dc.subject |
BUYER |
|
dc.subject |
CAPABILITIES |
|
dc.subject |
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVE BIDDING |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVE TENDERS |
|
dc.subject |
COMPETITIVENESS |
|
dc.subject |
CONSTRUCTION WORKS |
|
dc.subject |
CONTRACT |
|
dc.subject |
CONTRACT COST |
|
dc.subject |
CONTRACT DURATION |
|
dc.subject |
CONTRACTORS |
|
dc.subject |
CONTRACTS |
|
dc.subject |
COST ESTIMATE |
|
dc.subject |
COST ESTIMATES |
|
dc.subject |
CREDIBILITY |
|
dc.subject |
CREDITOR |
|
dc.subject |
DATA |
|
dc.subject |
DATABASE |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES |
|
dc.subject |
DEVELOPING COUNTRY |
|
dc.subject |
DUMMY VARIABLES |
|
dc.subject |
EQUIPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
EVALUATION SYSTEM |
|
dc.subject |
EXCHANGE |
|
dc.subject |
EXPENDITURE |
|
dc.subject |
FINANCE |
|
dc.subject |
GOOD |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE |
|
dc.subject |
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT |
|
dc.subject |
HOLDING |
|
dc.subject |
INFORMATION |
|
dc.subject |
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT |
|
dc.subject |
INSTRUMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
INTEREST |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL BANK |
|
dc.subject |
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS |
|
dc.subject |
JOINT VENTURE |
|
dc.subject |
LACK OF COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
LOCAL BUSINESS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET CONCENTRATION |
|
dc.subject |
MARKET CONDITIONS |
|
dc.subject |
MARKETPLACE |
|
dc.subject |
POLITICAL ECONOMY |
|
dc.subject |
POTENTIAL BIDDERS |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE AUCTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE BID |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE COMPARISON |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE COMPETITION |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE CRITERIA |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE EFFECT |
|
dc.subject |
PRICE EVALUATION |
|
dc.subject |
PRICES |
|
dc.subject |
PRIVATE SECTOR |
|
dc.subject |
PROCUREMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS |
|
dc.subject |
PROCUREMENT PRACTICES |
|
dc.subject |
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE |
|
dc.subject |
PRODUCT |
|
dc.subject |
PROFITS |
|
dc.subject |
PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC CONTRACTS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC SPENDING |
|
dc.subject |
PUBLIC WORKS |
|
dc.subject |
PURCHASING |
|
dc.subject |
QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
QUALIFIED BIDDERS |
|
dc.subject |
RENEGOTIATION |
|
dc.subject |
RESERVE |
|
dc.subject |
RESULT |
|
dc.subject |
RESULTS |
|
dc.subject |
SALE |
|
dc.subject |
SHARE |
|
dc.subject |
SUPPLY |
|
dc.subject |
TECHNICAL BIDS |
|
dc.subject |
TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION |
|
dc.subject |
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS |
|
dc.subject |
TELECOM |
|
dc.subject |
TENDER NOTICES |
|
dc.subject |
TENDER PROCESS |
|
dc.subject |
TENDERING |
|
dc.subject |
TENDERS |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSACTION |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSACTION COSTS |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSACTIONS |
|
dc.subject |
TRANSPARENCY |
|
dc.subject |
VALUE |
|
dc.subject |
WEB |
|
dc.subject |
WINNING BID |
|
dc.title |
Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions |
|
dc.type |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|
dc.coverage |
The World Region |
|