Sangam: A Confluence of Knowledge Streams

Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

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dc.creator Estache, Antonio
dc.creator Iimi, Atsushi
dc.date 2012-03-19T19:09:06Z
dc.date 2012-03-19T19:09:06Z
dc.date 2009-03-01
dc.date.accessioned 2023-02-17T21:08:17Z
dc.date.available 2023-02-17T21:08:17Z
dc.identifier http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20090304112718
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4051
dc.identifier.uri http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/245021
dc.description Limited competition has been a serious concern in infrastructure procurement. Importantly, however, there are normally a number of potential bidders initially showing interest in proposed projects. This paper focuses on tackling the question why these initially interested bidders fade out. An empirical problem is that no bids of fading-out firms are observable. They could decide not to enter the process at the beginning of the tendering or may be technically disqualified at any point in the selection process. This paper applies the double selection model to procurement data from road development projects in developing countries and examines why competition ends up restricted. It shows that bidders are self-selective and auctioneers also tend to limit participation depending on the size of contracts. Therefore, limited competition would likely lead to high infrastructure procurement costs.
dc.language English
dc.relation Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 4855
dc.rights CC BY 3.0 IGO
dc.rights http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/
dc.rights World Bank
dc.subject AFFILIATED
dc.subject AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS
dc.subject AUCTION
dc.subject AUCTION MARKETS
dc.subject AUCTION PROCESS
dc.subject AUCTIONS
dc.subject BID
dc.subject BID EVALUATION
dc.subject BID EVALUATION STAGE
dc.subject BID PRICE
dc.subject BIDDER
dc.subject BIDDERS
dc.subject BIDDING
dc.subject BIDDING DOCUMENTS
dc.subject BIDS
dc.subject BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP
dc.subject BUYER
dc.subject CAPABILITIES
dc.subject CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
dc.subject COMPETITION
dc.subject COMPETITIVE BIDDING
dc.subject COMPETITIVE TENDERS
dc.subject COMPETITIVENESS
dc.subject CONSTRUCTION WORKS
dc.subject CONTRACT
dc.subject CONTRACT COST
dc.subject CONTRACT DURATION
dc.subject CONTRACTORS
dc.subject CONTRACTS
dc.subject COST ESTIMATE
dc.subject COST ESTIMATES
dc.subject CREDIBILITY
dc.subject CREDITOR
dc.subject DATA
dc.subject DATABASE
dc.subject DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
dc.subject DEVELOPING COUNTRY
dc.subject DUMMY VARIABLES
dc.subject EQUIPMENT
dc.subject EVALUATION SYSTEM
dc.subject EXCHANGE
dc.subject EXPENDITURE
dc.subject FINANCE
dc.subject GOOD
dc.subject GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
dc.subject GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
dc.subject HOLDING
dc.subject INFORMATION
dc.subject INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
dc.subject INSTRUMENTS
dc.subject INTEREST
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL BANK
dc.subject INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
dc.subject JOINT VENTURE
dc.subject LACK OF COMPETITION
dc.subject LOCAL BUSINESS
dc.subject MARKET
dc.subject MARKET COMPETITION
dc.subject MARKET CONCENTRATION
dc.subject MARKET CONDITIONS
dc.subject MARKETPLACE
dc.subject POLITICAL ECONOMY
dc.subject POTENTIAL BIDDERS
dc.subject PRICE AUCTIONS
dc.subject PRICE BID
dc.subject PRICE COMPARISON
dc.subject PRICE COMPETITION
dc.subject PRICE CRITERIA
dc.subject PRICE EFFECT
dc.subject PRICE EVALUATION
dc.subject PRICES
dc.subject PRIVATE SECTOR
dc.subject PROCUREMENT
dc.subject PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
dc.subject PROCUREMENT PRACTICES
dc.subject PROCUREMENT PROCEDURE
dc.subject PRODUCT
dc.subject PROFITS
dc.subject PROSPECTIVE BIDDERS
dc.subject PUBLIC
dc.subject PUBLIC CONTRACTS
dc.subject PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
dc.subject PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SYSTEMS
dc.subject PUBLIC SPENDING
dc.subject PUBLIC WORKS
dc.subject PURCHASING
dc.subject QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
dc.subject QUALIFIED BIDDERS
dc.subject RENEGOTIATION
dc.subject RESERVE
dc.subject RESULT
dc.subject RESULTS
dc.subject SALE
dc.subject SHARE
dc.subject SUPPLY
dc.subject TECHNICAL BIDS
dc.subject TECHNICAL QUALIFICATION
dc.subject TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
dc.subject TELECOM
dc.subject TENDER NOTICES
dc.subject TENDER PROCESS
dc.subject TENDERING
dc.subject TENDERS
dc.subject TRANSACTION
dc.subject TRANSACTION COSTS
dc.subject TRANSACTIONS
dc.subject TRANSPARENCY
dc.subject VALUE
dc.subject WEB
dc.subject WINNING BID
dc.title Bidders’ Entry and Auctioneer’s Rejection : Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions
dc.type Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
dc.coverage The World Region
dc.coverage The World Region


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