Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance

Kaja, Ashwin; Werker, Eric

dc.creator	Kaja, Ashwin
dc.creator	Werker, Eric
dc.date	2012-03-30T07:12:38Z
dc.date	2012-03-30T07:12:38Z
dc.date	2010-08-30
dc.date.accessioned	2023-02-18T19:41:52Z
dc.date.available	2023-02-18T19:41:52Z
dc.identifier	World Bank Economic Review
dc.identifier	1564-698X
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4519
dc.identifier.uri	http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/250004
dc.description	Most major decisions at the World Bank are made by its Board of Executive Directors. While some countries enjoy the opportunity to serve on this powerful body, most countries rarely, if ever, get that chance. This gives rise to the question: Does board membership lead to higher funding from the World Bank's two main development financing institutions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). Empirical analysis shows that developing countries serving on the board can expect more than double the funding from the IBRD as countries not on the board. In absolute terms, countries on the board receive an average $60 million “bonus” in IBRD loans, an amount that rises in years when IBRD loans are in high demand, particularly for countries in the most influential seats. This effect is more likely driven by informal rules and norms in the boardroom than by the power of the vote itself. No significant effect is found in IDA funding. These results point to challenges of global governance through representative institutions.
dc.publisher	World Bank
dc.rights	CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights	World Bank
dc.subject	banks
dc.subject	board members
dc.subject	board membership
dc.subject	commercial loans
dc.subject	company
dc.subject	corporate board
dc.subject	corporate finance
dc.subject	corporate governance
dc.subject	corporations
dc.subject	debt
dc.subject	distribution of net income
dc.subject	equality
dc.subject	fiscal policy
dc.subject	intergovernmental transfers
dc.subject	legislation
dc.subject	limited
dc.subject	loan commitments
dc.subject	member states
dc.subject	shareholders
dc.subject	society
dc.title	Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the Dilemma of Global Governance
dc.type	Journal Article
dc.type	Journal Article
dc.coverage	Africa
dc.coverage	Latin America & Caribbean
dc.coverage	Europe and Central Asia
dc.coverage	Egypt, Arab Republic of
dc.coverage	Brazil