Sangam: A Confluence of Knowledge Streams

Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention

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dc.creator Keefer, Philip
dc.creator Neumayer, Eric
dc.creator Plumper, Thomas
dc.date 2012-03-30T07:28:47Z
dc.date 2012-03-30T07:28:47Z
dc.date 2011
dc.date.accessioned 2023-02-18T19:43:15Z
dc.date.available 2023-02-18T19:43:15Z
dc.identifier World Development
dc.identifier 0305750X
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4610
dc.identifier.uri http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/250093
dc.description Governments can significantly reduce earthquake mortality by enforcing quake-proof construction regulation. We examine why many governments do not. First, mortality is lower in countries with higher earthquake propensity, where the payoffs to investments in mortality prevention are greater. Second, the opportunity costs of these investments are higher in poorer countries; mortality is correspondingly less responsive to propensity in poor countries. Third, mortality is higher at any level of quake propensity when governments have fewer incentives to provide public goods, such as in autocracies with less institutionalized ruling parties or in more corrupt countries.
dc.language EN
dc.relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights World Bank
dc.subject Health Production I120
dc.subject Economics of Regulation L510
dc.subject Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction: Government Policy L780
dc.subject Climate
dc.subject Natural Disasters
dc.subject Global Warming Q540
dc.title Earthquake Propensity and the Politics of Mortality Prevention
dc.type Journal Article
dc.type Journal Article


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