Sangam: A Confluence of Knowledge Streams

Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism

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dc.creator Keefer, Philip
dc.creator Vlaicu, Razvan
dc.date 2012-03-30T07:28:48Z
dc.date 2012-03-30T07:28:48Z
dc.date 2008
dc.date.accessioned 2023-02-18T19:43:16Z
dc.date.available 2023-02-18T19:43:16Z
dc.identifier Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
dc.identifier 87566222
dc.identifier http://hdl.handle.net/10986/4611
dc.identifier.uri http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/250094
dc.description Despite having adopted the political institutions of established democracies, democratizing countries display a systematically different pattern of fiscal outcomes. This article attributes these differences to the low credibility of electoral promises in new democracies. We study a model of electoral competition where candidates have two costly means to make themselves credible: spending resources to communicate directly with voters and exploiting preexisting patron-client networks. The costs of building credibility are endogenous and lead to higher targeted transfers and corruption and lower public good provision. The analysis demonstrates that in low-credibility states, political appeals to patron-client networks may be welfare enhancing, but in the long run, they delay political development by discouraging direct appeals to voters that are essential for credible mass-based political parties. The model explains why public investment and corruption are higher in younger democracies and why democratizing reforms had greater success in Victorian England than in the Dominican Republic.
dc.language EN
dc.relation http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo
dc.rights World Bank
dc.subject Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D720
dc.subject Network Formation and Analysis: Theory D850
dc.title Democracy, Credibility, and Clientelism
dc.type Journal Article
dc.type Journal Article


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