| dc.description |
On the basis of a dual-process account of reactions to general and specific cases, counterfactual thinking was hypothesized to occur more frequently in response to specific events than to general events. Cognitive reactions to general events were expected to be influenced by pre-event expectations, whereas reactions to specific events were expected to be influenced by counterfactual thinking. Such differences in processing may result in different comparison cases that ultimately influence reactions to the event as well as decisions regarding similar, future events. When people experience undesirable outcomes, counterfactual thoughts allow them to imagine more desirable possibilities, and thus greater confidence for future occurrences. Five experiments were designed to investigate these and other related hypotheses. In Experiment 1, participants were visually presented with general or specific outcomes of a golfing competition. Experiment 2 asked participants to complete a trivia test and provided them with global or specific performance feedback. Experiment 3 examined the impact of both upward and downward counterfactuals following the visual presentation of general or specific highlights of a tennis match. In Experiment 4, participants were asked to play several games of blackjack and were provided with global or specific performance feedback. Participants in Experiment 5 observed actual horse racing events, received general information about the events, or received thought-listing statements made by another participant in addition to general information about the events. In each experiment, some participants were also asked to complete a thought-listing task. Participants indicated their subjective confidence about the outcome of a similar, future event or placed bets on the outcome. Overall, the results supported the hypotheses. Counterfactual thoughts were observed more frequently in response to specific events than to general events. Counterfactual thought frequency also mediated the relationships between event type and decisions about similar, future events. A follow-up experiment to Experiment 5 provided evidence that counterfactual thought confidence also influences decisions regarding similar, future events. Although pre-event expectations were more clearly linked to reactions regarding general events than to specific events in Experiment 1, these links were inconsistent across experiments. Results are discussed in light of related dual-process theories and decision-making research. |
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