This thesis is an examination of perspectivism in philosophy of science, an approach proposed as a via media between standard realist and antirealist views. The thesis is structured into four parts. Part I introduces the varieties of perspectivism in the literature and outlines the specific form of perspectivism that is the focus of this thesis, which is based on the work of Ronald Giere. I distinguish Giere's perspectivism from traditional realism and outline the central challenge to the position, a challenge that I call "Escape from Perspective". The next two parts are critical. In part II, I examine Giere's perspectivist account of instruments ("instrumental perspectivism"). I find that Giere's arguments for instrumental perspectivism fail, and that instrumental perspectivism is dependent on a perspectivist account of theories and models ("theoretical perspectivism") in a way that robs it of philosophical significance. If this is correct, the question is simply whether theoretical perspectivism can be defended. This question is taken up in Part III. This part focuses on two arguments for perspectivism, the incompatible models argument and the failure of fit argument. I argue that the incompatible models argument is unconvincing, but that the failure of fit argument presents a significant challenge to standard realist views. The rest of Part III attacks the potential realist responses to this argument. Finally, in Part IV, I turn to the constructive project of developing a perspectivist approach that respects the insights of the failure of fit argument. In this part, I present what I take to be the most defensible form of perspectivism, and I argue that it has the resources to meet the Escape from Perspective challenge. Although my perspectivism is different from Giere's in many respects, I end by showing that it exhibits all the characteristics distinctive of perspectivism, as Giere defined it.