| dc.contributor |
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.) |
|
| dc.contributor |
Computer Science (CS) |
|
| dc.creator |
Michael, J. Bret |
|
| dc.creator |
Nerode, Anil |
|
| dc.creator |
Wijesekera, Duminda |
|
| dc.date |
2017-11-21T18:01:41Z |
|
| dc.date |
2017-11-21T18:01:41Z |
|
| dc.date |
2005-11 |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2022-05-19T00:15:25Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2022-05-19T00:15:25Z |
|
| dc.identifier |
J.B. Michael, A. Nerode, D. Wijesekera, "On the provision of safety assurance via safety kernels for modern weapon systems," Proceedings of the Workshop on Software Assessment 5th, Chicago, Illinois, November 8, 2005, 4 p. |
|
| dc.identifier |
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56228 |
|
| dc.identifier.uri |
http://localhost:8080/xmlui/handle/CUHPOERS/55601 |
|
| dc.description |
In this paper we discuss some of the challenges and approaches for providing safety assurance for modern weapon systems via software-based safety kernels. We argue that software-centric approaches for designing and verifying safety kernels are flawed. We claim that the design and verification of safety kernels for complex event-driven real-time systems is a matter of physics and dynamical system analysis of system design. We describe an approach for rapidly prototyping safety kernels (and plants and controllers) using an agent-based safety-kernel architecture. The approach utilizes multiagent modeling and hybrid automata. |
|
| dc.format |
4 p. |
|
| dc.format |
application/pdf |
|
| dc.publisher |
IEEE |
|
| dc.rights |
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States. |
|
| dc.subject |
System safety |
|
| dc.subject |
Safety kernel |
|
| dc.subject |
Hybrid automata |
|
| dc.subject |
Verification |
|
| dc.title |
On the provision of safety assurance via safety kernels for modern weapon systems |
|
| dc.type |
Article |
|